No serious philosopher or student of philosophy can afford to neglect Wittgenstein's work. Professor Fogelin provides an authoritative critical evaluation of both the _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_ and _Philosophical Investigations_, enabling the reader to come to grips with these difficult yet key works. Fogelin explains Wittgenstein's attempt in the _Tractatus_ to combine a picture theory of propositional structure, and also explores Wittgenstein's own criticisms of the Tractarian synthesis. He gives particular attention to topics in the philosophy of language, logic, psychology and the (...) foundations of mathematics, examining Wittgenstein's work on these fields and arguing that Wittgenstein's criticisms in these areas form the basis for a radically new standpoint in philosophy. (shrink)

Hans-Georg Gadamer is widely recognized as the leading exponent of philosophical hermeneutics. The essays in this collection examine Gadamer's biography, the core of hermeneutical theory, and the significance of his work for ethics, aesthetics, the social sciences, and theology. There is full consideration of Gadamer's appropriation of Hegel, Heidegger and the Greeks, as well as his relation to modernity, critical theory and poststructuralism.

No serious philosopher or student of philosophy can afford to neglect Wittgenstein's work. Professor Fogelin provides an authoritative critical evaluation of both the _Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus_ and _Philosophical Investigations_, enabling the reader to come to grips with these difficult yet key works. Fogelin explains Wittgenstein's attempt in the _Tractatus_ to combine a picture theory of propositional structure, and also explores Wittgenstein's own criticisms of the Tractarian synthesis. He gives particular attention to topics in the philosophy of language, logic, psychology and the (...) foundations of mathematics, examining Wittgenstein's work on these fields and arguing that Wittgenstein's criticisms in these areas form the basis for a radically new standpoint in philosophy. (shrink)

‘The Natural System’ is the abstract notion of the order in living diversity. The richness and complexity of this notion is revealed by the diversity of representations of the Natural System drawn by ornithologists in the Nineteenth Century. These representations varied in overall form from stars, to circles, to maps, to evolutionary trees and cross-sections through trees. They differed in their depiction of affinity, analogy, continuity, directionality, symmetry, reticulation and branching, evolution, and morphological convergence and divergence. Some representations were two-dimensional, (...) and some were three-dimensional; n-dimensional representations were discussed but never illustrated. The study of diagrammatic representations of the Natural System is made difficult by the frequent failure of authors to discuss them in their texts, and by the consequent problem of distinguishing features which carried meaning from arbitrary features and printing conventions which did not. Many of the systematics controversies of the last thirty years have their roots in the conceptual problems which surrounded the Natural System in the late 1800s, problems which were left unresolved when interest in higher-level systematics declined at the turn of this century. (shrink)

The sciences of ethology and sociobiology have as premisses that certain dispositions and behavioural patterns have evolved with species and, therefore, that the acts of individual animals and men must be viewed in light of innate determinates. These ideas are much older than the now burgeoning disciplines of the biology of behaviour. Their elements were fused in the early constructions of evolutionary theory, and they became integral parts of the developing conception. Historians, however, have usually neglected close examination of the (...) role behaviour has played in the rise of evolutionary thought. (shrink)

Our image of Herbert Spencer is that of a bald, dyspeptic bachelor, spending his days in rooming houses, and fussing about government interference with individual liberties. Beatrice Webb, who knew him as a girl and young woman recalls for us just this picture. In her diary for January 4, 1885, she writes: Royal Academy private view with Herbert Spencer. His criticisms on art dreary, all bound down by the “possible” if not probable. That poor old man would miss me on (...) the whole more than any other mortal. Has real anxiety for my welfare—physical and mental. Told him story of my stopping cart horse in Hyde Park and policeman refusing to come off his beat to hold it. Want of public spirit in passers-by not stopping it before. “Yes, that is another instance of my first principle of government. Directly you get state intervention you cease to have public spirit in individuals; that will be a constantly increasing tendency and the State, like the policeman, will be so bound by red-tape rules that it will frequently leave undone the simplest duties.”1 Spencer appears a man whose strangled emotions would yet cling to a woman whose philosophy would be completely alien to his own, as Webb’s Fabian Socialism turned out to be. Our image of Darwin is more complex than our image of Spencer. We might think of him nestled in the bosom of his large family, kindly, and just a little sad. The photo of him taken by Julia Cameron reveals the visage of an Old Testament prophet, though one, not fearsome, but made wise by contemplating the struggle of life on this earth. These images have deeply colored our reaction to the ideas of each thinker. The pictures are not false, but they are cropped portraits that tend to distort our reactions to the theories of each. If we examine the major features of their respective. (shrink)

The phrase per remos alii (Aen. 10.290) has baffled Vergil scholars for centuries, in which regard they have all just guessed at its meaning without citing any evidence to justify their views. During the 1960s, Gilbert Highet proposed a solution to the problem after seeing a scene in a Hollywood film in which a famous actor “ran down the oars” (i. e., ran over or along or across the oars)-a solution Highet would mention in his Vergil classes but never researched (...) for publication. This article attempts to justify Highet’s suggestion by considering, beyond the cinematic and related contemporary evidence, a variety of classical, medieval, and archaeological sources of information. (shrink)

After almost a decade, the discussion initiated by Professor Edmund Gettier's provocative paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” continues. The most recent contribution to this discussion is Professor John Turk Saunders' attempt to counter Professor Irving Thalberg's claim that a principle that Gettier employs in reaching his notorious negative conclusion is unjustified. I am moved to add to the discussion at this time because it seems to me that the principle in question is unjustified. But more fundamentally, Gettier's argument fails (...) because the putative counter-examples on which it rests fail to make their intended point. I shall discuss these claims in turn.The epistemic principle which I consider unjustified is the one which Thalberg has called the Principle of Deducibility for Justification and which Gettier formulates as follows: “for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and S deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q.”. (shrink)

A sourcebook for developing and facilitating collaborative groups capable of continuously adapting to anticipate the evolving learning needs of students. Based on a theoretical foundation of schools as complex systems in which linear management models are no longer sufficient.

Ever since Ph. Kohlmann in his Teubner edition of the Thebaid asserted that he had used cod. Parisinus 13046, one of the MSS. formerly of St. Germain des Prés, this MS. has been known by reputation to his successors and other students of Statian textual problems, and, designed by the letter S, it is alluded to and cited in the edition of Garrod and in the newer Teubner of Klotz, which appeared in 1908. The two later editors confessed that they (...) themselves had not examined the MS., but were relying upon the information accessible in Kohlmann's edition. Doubts having been cast from more than one source upon Kohlmann's accuracy and the soundness of his reports, while at the same time the importance of S as a member of the ω group was emphasized by Mr. Garrod and Dr. Klotz in spite of the incomplete evidence at their disposal, it seemed worth while to the writer to examine the MS. for himself and to make a thorough collation of it. This has been done in the summer of 1932. (shrink)

Arguably the most famous heterotopia that appears in Foucault’s work is the Chinese encyclopedia, which originates in the fiction of Jorge Luis Borges. Drawing on this citation of Borges, this article examines Foucault’s notion of the heterotopia as it relates to order and knowledge production. Frequently, heterotopias are understood as sites of resistance. This article argues that shifting the focus from resistance to order and knowledge production reveals how heterotopias make the spatiality of order legible. By juxtaposing and combining many (...) spaces in one site, heterotopias problematize received knowledge by destabilizing the ground on which knowledge is built. Yet heterotopias always remain connected to the dominant order; thus as heterotopias clash with dominant orders, they simultaneously produce new ways of knowing. This article first explores the tensions between Foucault’s two definitions of heterotopias before connecting these definitions to Foucault’s distinctly spatial understanding of knowledge as emerging from a clash of forces. Finally, the paper ends by returning to the relationship between Foucault, Borges, and heterotopias. (shrink)

Elaborating on views I have expressed elsewhere, I argue that the common-sense notion of linguistic competence as a kind of knowledge is both required by common-sense explanatory and justificatory practice and furthermore fully compatible with the non-intentional characterization of linguistic competence provided by current linguistic theory, which is itself non-intentional.